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Abstract:
Node misbehavior due to selfish or malicious reasons or faulty
nodes can significantly degrade the performance of mobile ad-hoc
networks. To cope with misbehavior in such self-organized net-
works, nodes need to be able to automatically adapt their strategy
to changing levels of cooperation. Existing approaches such as eco-
nomic incentives or secure routing by cryptography alleviate some
of the problems, but not all. We describe the use of a self-policing
mechanism based on reputation to enable mobile ad-hoc networks
to keep functioning despite the presence of misbehaving nodes.
The reputation system in all nodes makes them detect misbehavior
locally by observation and use of second-hand information. Once a
misbehaving node is detected it is automatically isolated from the
network. We classify the features of such reputation systems and
describe possible implementations of each of them. We explain in
particular how it is possible to use second-hand information while
mitigating contamination by spurious ratings.
1 Misbehavior in Mobile Ad-Hoc Net-
works
In mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes are both routers and terminals.
For lack of routing infrastructure, they have to cooperate to com-
municate. Cooperation at the network layer means routing, i.e.,
finding a path for a packet, and forwarding, i.e., relaying packets
for others.
Misbehavior means deviation from regular routing and forwardin.
It arises for several reasons, non-intentionally when a node is
faulty; Intentional misbehavior can aim at an advantage for the
misbehaving node or just constitute vandalism, such as enabling
a malicious node to mount an attack or a selfish node to save
power. In game-theoretic terms, cooperation in mobile ad-hoc net-
works poses a dilemma. To save battery, bandwidth, and processing
power, nodes should not forward packets for others. If this domi-
nant strategy is adopted, however, the outcome is a non-functional
network when multi-hop routes are needed, so all nodes are worse
off.
Without countermeasures, the effects of misbehavior have been
shown to dramatically decrease network performance [2, 9]. De-
pending on the proportion of misbehaving nodes and their strate-
gies, network throughput decrease, packet loss, denial of service,
and network partioning can result.These detrimental effects of mis-
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behavior can endanger the entire network. Unless misbehavior is
addressed to provide reliable and trustworthy ad-hoc networks,
users might be reluctant to use them.
The question we address is the following. How can we make an
existing system keep working despite misbehavior? Can one weed
out misbehaving nodes? When fewer nodes deviate from the proto-
col, the network performance is more predictable and less chaotic.
The main solutions to address this question are secure routing,
economic incentives, and detection and reputation systems. Secure
routing using cryptography, such as Ariadne or SRP [6] provides
preventive means for specific malicious attacks, e.g. compromising
routes. Secure routing applies to route discovery. Once a route is
found, its use is not secured.
Economic incentives such as payment schemes aim at making self-
ish nodes forward for others despite the power usage and effort this
entails. Nodes are paid for forwarding and pay for the forwarding
of their own packets by other nodes. An example are nuglets, a vir-
tual currency, or the credit counter [6] in secure hardware, where
nodes keep track of remaining battery power and credit. These ap-
proaches make it undesirable for selfish nodes to deny forwarding.
They do not, however, target other types of misbehavior.
Secure routing and economic incentives solve part of the question,
but not all. There remains a variety of observable types of mis-
behavior that they cannot cure easily, such as silent route changes,
which may be addressed by detection and reputation systems. They
monitor and rate the behavior of other nodes in routing and for-
warding, such that nodes can respond according to their opinion
about other nodes. The opinion a node has of another is called
reputation. The goal of a reputation system is to enable nodes to
make informed decisions about which nodes to cooperate with or
exclude from the network. Reputation systems can be used to cope
with any kind of misbehavior as long as it is observable.
We next describe a framework for detection and reputation sys-
tems and list a number of proposed approaches. Then we analyze
the main issues and features for reputation systems; we find that
these are: representation of information and classification, use of
second-hand information, trust, and redemption and secondary re-
sponse. In separate sections, we discuss how each of these features
can be implemented, using one such reputation system as a basis
for comparison. We explain in particular how it is possible to use
second-hand information while mitigating contamination by spu-
rious ratings. Then we illustrate on some scenarios the types of
misbehavior targeting reputation systems.
1
2 Detection and Reputation Systems
The goal of a detection and reputation system is to enable nodes to
adapt to changes in the network environment caused by misbehav-
ing nodes by the following functions.
Monitoring. The goal of monitoring is to gather first-hand in-
formation about the behavior of nodes in the network. Monitoring
systems detect misbehavior that can be distinguished from regular
behavior by observation.
Not forwarding is just one of the possible types of misbehavior
in mobile ad-hoc networks. Several others, mostly concerned with
routing rather that forwarding have been suggested, such as black
hole routing, gray hole routing, worm hole routing. We classify
misbehavior types as packet dropping, modification, fabrication,
or timing misbehavior; many of these can be detected by direct
observation as we have shown in a test-bed implementation [5].
To detect misbehavior, nodes take into account the packets they re-
ceive (e.g. a received acknowledgment from the destination means
that all the nodes on the route cooperated in forwarding )and they
can also use enhanced passive acknowledgments (PACK) by over-
hearing the transmissions of the next hop on the route, since they
are within range when using omnidirectional antennas. For in-
stance, if they do not overhear a retransmission to the following
node within a timeout of e.g. 100 ms or if the overheard transmis-
sion shows that the packet header has been illegitimately modified,
they conclude misbehavior. To distinguish from physical failures
of the next hop, the timeout allows for retransmission attempts if
the transmission of the next hop fails. If there are link failures over
a longer time, the node can expect a route error (RERR). To ac-
count for connectivity problems at the monitoring node itself, it
disregards PACK timouts in the case of link-layer error messages
received from its own interface.
In addition to a list of known types of misbehavior, nodes can au-
tomatically learn about new misbehavior in analogy to the human
immune system [1].
Reputation. Reputation systems are used for example in some
on-line auctioning systems. They provide a means of obtaining a
quality rating of participants of transactions by having the buyer
and seller give each other feedback. The two main ideas behind
reputation systems are that, first, it is used to serve as an incen-
tive for good behavior to avoid the negative consequences a bad
reputation can entail. Second, it provides a basis for the choice of
prospective transaction partners. The relevant properties of a repu-
tation system are discussed in the next sections.
The terms reputation and trust have been used for various con-
cepts, also synonymously. We define reputation here to mean the
performance of a node in participating in the base protocol as seen
by others. For mobile ad-hoc networking this means participation
in routing and forwarding. By trust we denote the performance of
a node in the policing protocol that protects the base protocol, here
the reliability as a witness to provide honest reports.
The use of second-hand information, i. e. reputation information
obtained from others, enables nodes to find out about misbehaving
nodes before making a bad experience. Also, in mobile ad-hoc net-
works, nodes might not meet every node that they need for multi-
hop forwarding, but with second-hand information they can make
informed decisions about which nodes to use for their paths.
Response. Detection and reputation systems aim at isolating nodes
that are deemed misbehaving by not using them for routing and for-
warding, and most also isolate them additionally by denying them
service. This isolation has three purposes. The first is to reduce the
effect of misbehavior by depriving the misbehaving node of the op-
portunity to participate in the network. The second is to serve as an
incentive to behave well to not be denied service. Finally, the third
is to obtain better service by not using misbehaving nodes on the
path. The isolation is done by each node autonomously, without
consensus or human intervention.
Monitoring, reputation, and response come at the price of over-
hearing transmissions of others, keeping a reputation rating about
nodes of interest and updating it at each observation. The gain can
be measured in increased throughput and decreased number of lost
packets, i.e. needless transmissions [2]. Note that the cost, in terms
of battery use, of transmissions is much higher than that of simple
computations. Nodes have to listen to traffic anyway to find out
whether it is for them.
3 Approaches for Detection and Reputa-
tion Systems
The following approaches aim at protecting Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR) [7], a reactive routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc net-
works. Briefly, it works as follows: Nodes send out a ROUTE RE-
QUEST (RREQ) message, all nodes that receive it forward it to
their neighbors and put themselves into the source route. If a re-
ceiving node is the destination, or has a route to the destination, it
does not forward the request, but sends a REPLY message contain-
ing the full source route. After receiving one or several routes, the
source picks the best (by default the shortest), stores it, and sends
messages along that path. In case of a link failure, the detecting
node sends an error (RERR) toward the source.
3.1 Watchdog and Pathrater
Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker [9] consider non-forwarding. They call
the monitoring part watchdog, and the combined reputation and re-
sponse part path rater. The Watchdog detects non-forwarding by
overhearing the transmission of the next node. Once misbehavior
is detected, the source of the concerned path is informed. For rep-
utation, ratings are kept about every node in the network and the
rating of actively used nodes is updated periodically. Nodes select
routes with the highest average node rating. The two components
enable nodes to avoid misbehaving nodes in their routes as a re-
sponse. This way, network throughput increases as compared to
normal DSR. The response part, in contrast to most other detec-
tion and reputation systems (and all others in this paper), does not
punish misbehaving nodes that do not cooperate, but rather relieves
them of forwarding for others, whereas their messages continue to
be forwarded.
2
3.2 CONFIDANT
Our own contribution to detection and reputation systems is called
CONFIDANT, short for Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dy-
namic Ad-hoc NeTworks, with an initial version with predeter-
mined trust [2], superseded by an adaptive Bayesian reputation
and trust system [4]. Nodes monitor their neighborhood and de-
tect several kinds of misbehavior, as listed in Section 2, by means
of an enhanced passive acknowledgment mechanism [5]. Nodes
also gather second-hand information from others and cope with
spurious ratings. By Bayesian estimation, nodes classify others as
misbehaving or normal. Accordingly, nodes exclude misbehaving
nodes from the network as a response, by both avoiding them for
routing and by denying them cooperation, so that misbehavior will
not pay off but result in isolation and thus cannot continue.
3.3 CORE
Michiardi and Molva [10] proposed a COllaborative REputation
mechanism that also has a watchdog component for monitoring;
it is complemented by a reputation mechanism that differentiates
between subjective reputation (observations), indirect reputation
(positive reports by others), and functional reputation (task-specific
behavior), which are weighted for a combined reputation value that
is used to make decisions about cooperation or gradual isolation of
a node. Reputation values are obtained by regarding nodes as re-
questers and providers, and comparing the expected result to the
actually obtained result of a request. Nodes only exchange positive
reputation information.
3.4 Context-Aware Detection
With this mechanism by Paul and Westhoff [12], accusations of
nodes are related to the context of a unique route discovery pro-
cess and a stipulated time period. For monitoring, a combination is
used that consists of un-keyed hash verification of routing mes-
sages and the detection of misbehavior by comparing a cached
routing packet to overheard packets, thereby detecting tampering
of the RREQ header. In contrast to Watchdog and Pathrater, sev-
eral types of misbehavior are detected. The decision of how to treat
nodes in the future, the response, is based on accusations of others,
whereby a number of accusations pointing to a single attack, the
approximate knowledge of the topology, and context-aware infer-
ence enable a node to rate an accused node. Accusations are sent to
the source, which infers based on majority voting and can inform
trusted nodes.
3.5 SORI
A Secure and Objective Reputation-based Incentive scheme was
proposed by He, Wu, and Khosla [8], it targets the non-forwarding
misbehavior type and uses a Watchdog-like mechanism for moni-
toring. The reputation system keeps count of the packets forwarded
both by and for neighboring nodes. Reputation ratings consist of
the ratio of these counts, taking into account the confidence into
the rating, proportional to the number of packets requested for for-
warding. Nodes propagate reputation ratings locally, this second-
hand information is weighted by credibility, which is derived from
the ratio above. The response is given by packet dropping with a
probability determined by the reputation. SORI additionally em-
ploys a hash-chain based authentication for propagated reputation
ratings.
4 Features and Functions of Reputation
Systems
The main goal of a reputation system for mobile ad-hoc networks
is to make sense of gathered information about the behavior of
others. We classify the features of a reputation system as follows.
1. Representation of information and classification. These de-
termine how monitored events are stored and translated into
reputation ratings, and how ratings are classified for response.
2. Use of second-hand information. Reputation systems can ei-
ther rely exclusively on own observations or also consider in-
formation obtained by others. Second-hand information can,
however, be spurious, which raises the questions of how to
incorporate it in a safe way and whether to propagate it.
3. Trust. The use of trust influences the decision of using first or
second-hand information. The design choices are about how
to build trust, out-of-band trust versus building trust on experi-
ence, how to represent trust, and how to manage the influence
of trust on responses.
4. Redemption and secondary response. When a node has been
isolated, it can no longer be observed. The question of how
those nodes should be rated over time are addressed by these
two features. If the misbehavior of a node is temporary, a re-
demption mechanism ensures that it can come back to the net-
work. It is, however, desirable to prevent recidivists from ex-
ploiting a redemption mechanism. This can be achieved by
secondary response, meaning a quicker response to a recur-
ring threat, in analogy to the human immune system.
We explore these features in the following sections, using a de-
scription of how they are implemented in CONFIDANT as a basis
for comparison.
5 Representation of Information and
Classification
CONFIDANT uses a Bayesian approach in which the belief of a
node i about another node j, as captured in the reputation rating,
is updated at each observation to estimate the true but unknown
probability of misbehavior θ. Nodes are classified as misbehav-
ing, when the expected value of θ exceeds a misbehavior tolerance
threshold, and as normal otherwise. To update ratings, node i keeps
a record of first-hand information of node j, called Fi,j which has
the form (α, β), as parameters to the Beta function for estimating
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θ. Let s = 1 with misbehavior, s = 0 otherwise. Then
α := uα + s (1)
β := uβ + (1− s) (2)
The weight u is a discount factor for past experiences. In addi-
tion, during inactivity periods, the values of α, β periodically de-
cay as follows. Whenever the inactivity time expires, α := uα and
β := uβ. This is to allow for redemption even in the absence of
observations, as will be explained in Section 8.
The approach is illustrated as a scenario in Figure 1. Node A sends
packets via nodes B and C to the destination D. For every packet,
nodes keep track of the behavior of the next-hop node and remem-
ber whether it has forwarded the packet correctly. A stores ratings
about B, B about C, etc.
(a) B misbehaves. (b) Nodes publish first-hand in-
formation.
(c) A rates C. (d) A isolates C.
Figure 1: Misbehavior Scenario. Node A’s View of the Network.
Suppose that C misbehaves by dropping the packet instead of for-
warding it, as shown in Figure 1(a). B’s rating of C then becomes
bad. Once A classifies C as misbehaving, it also isolates it from the
network.
CORE represents reputation values in a reputation table, with sepa-
rate entries for each node and each function. The reputation values
have a range of [−1, 1], 0 being the neutral value. The reputation
table captures subjective reputation, indirect reputation, and func-
tional reputation separately, the overall reputation is a function of
the previous. Pathrater keeps one rating per node, initially set to
0.5, which is incremented at periodic intervals of 200 ms, decre-
mented by 0.05 when a link break is detected, and by 100 upon
misbehavior. The rating range of normal nodes is [0, 0.8]. Context-
Aware Detection has a format for accusation messages and focuses
on the inference of misbehavior, which does not depend on reputa-
tion representation. SORI keeps counters for the number of pack-
ets requested for forwarding and those actually forwarded and a
reputation rating calculated from these counts along with derived
confidence and credibility metrics.
6 Use of Second-Hand Information
In the scenario, since A is not in range with C, it cannot directly
observe its behavior and thus cannot detect C’s misbehavior. This
is solved by allowing the use of second-hand information. In CON-
FIDANT, in addition to keeping track of direct local observation,
nodes publish, as shown in Figure 1(b), their first-hand informa-
tion from time to time by local broadcasts to exchange information
with other nodes. The published information from others is called
second-hand information. It is not propagated further. Nodes rely
mostly on local information but they can also take into account the
local information of other nodes to gradually get a global view of
the network. A thus receives information from its neighbors, here
E, F, G, and B, about other nodes, including C. Again, since A has
no first-hand information about C in our scenario, it can only find
out about C’s misbehavior by second-hand information. There is,
however, a problem since second-hand information can be spuri-
ous, e.g. false accusations. There is a trade-off between the detec-
tion speed gained by second-hand information (detection before
encounter) and the classification vulnerability introduced.
CONFIDANT has a combination of two mechanisms to cope with
spurious second-hand information. First, only compatible second-
hand information is considered, i.e. information Fk,j tjat does not
deviate more than a positive constant d from the expected θ of Ri,j ,
as determined by a deviation test:
|E(Beta(αF , βF ))− E(Beta(α, β))| ≥ d (3)
If the test is positive, the first-hand information Fk,j is considered
incompatible by i and discarded. Else Fk,j is incorporated into Ri,j
such that Ri,j := Ri,j + wFk,j . This is a modified Baysian linear
pool model merging, where w is a small constant to weight second-
hand information. Second, even when second-hand information is
compatible, it is only allowed to slightly influence the reputation
rating, determined by the weight w.
Before taking into account this second-hand information to form
A’s reputation rating about C, A therefore checks whether the
second-hand information is compatible with the reputation rating it
already has about C. As shown in Figure 1(c), assume that E and G
also had bad experience with C, so B, E, and G are compatible with
A’s accumulated reputation rating for C. Node F, however, praises
C as well behaving, thus deviating substantially from node A’s rat-
ing. A will let E’s, G’s, and B’s second-hand information slightly
influence its reputation rating about C, but it will not consider the
second-hand information received from F.
In Pathrater, nodes send notifications of detected misbehavior to
the source of the route, false accusations are addressed. CORE
permits only positive second-hand information, which protects it
from spurious accusations but not spurious positive ratings by col-
luding nodes. Context-Aware Detection accepts negative second-
hand information when at least four separate sources make such a
claim, otherwise the node spreading the information is considered
misbehaving. While this inadvertently serves as a disincentive to
share ratings, it is robust to spurious accusations by single nodes or
small collusions. SORI also exploits the detection speed-up by us-
ing second-hand information broadcast locally and considers them
using a credibility metric, which itself is based on the ratio of re-
quested to actually forwarded packets.
4
7 Trust
The main benefit of using trust is to accelerate the detection of
misbehaving nodes, and hence the response, by taking into account
also incompatible information, yet in a safe way.
In the initial version of CONFIDANT [2], a predetermined trust
mechanism similar to the trust management in Pretty Good Pri-
vacy (PGP) for key validation and certification was used for trust
management for routing and forwarding. When either the source
of an accusation was fully trusted or several partially trusted nodes
reported the same and their respective assigned trust added up to a
value of one entirely trusted node or more, it was considered evi-
dence.
To be robust against trusted yet trustworthy nodes, CONFIDANT
now uses adaptive trust without predetermined ratings, where trust
Ti,j is based on node i’s experience of how honest node j is, i.e.
whether the reported first-hand information published by node j is
likely to be true. Trust ratings are used to speed up the detection by
allowing to accept second-hand information coming from a trust-
worthy node without checking for deviation, they are generated
automatically by keeping track of the results of the deviation test
and updating in analogy to the reputation ratings. In our scenario
as depicted in Figure 1, A improves the trust rating it has about E
and B and worsens the one about F.
SORI bases the trust into second-hand information on the forward-
ing behavior, the other schemes do not have a notion of trust and
just accept information from others.
8 Redemption and Secondary Response
To give more emphasis to recent behavior, CONFIDANT nodes
discount all ratings periodically and upon observation by exponen-
tial decay, we call this fading. This way, nodes cannot capitalize
on previous good behavior and it provides a means for redemp-
tion. It is useful to allow for redemption of isolated nodes that
are no longer misbehaving, e.g. when the bug of a formerly faulty
node was fixed. With fading, the reputation of an isolated node will
eventually become tolerable and come back, even when no direct
observation is possible due to its isolation. If however, the node
misbehaves, it will be isolated again even faster than before. This
is achieved by keeping track of which nodes have misbehaved in
the past and providing a secondary response by lowering the mis-
behavior tolerance threshold.
In CORE an isolated node should get redemption if it behaves well
again, but since it cannot prove itself when isolated, it remains
isolated. Pathrater suggests a resetting of reputation to the neutral
value after a timeout or, alternatively, a slow periodic increase of
reputation. Context-Aware Detection and SORI have no redemp-
tion or secondary response.
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9 Sample Scenarios
9.1 Misbehavior without Liars
The most common scenario for the performance evaluation of de-
tection and reputation systems has been a mobile ad-hoc network
where some nodes misbehave by dropping packets they should
forward for others. All the approaches discussed in this article
have observed increased network performance despite the presence
of misbehaving nodes, compared to normal defenseless networks.
Figure 2 shows the effect of CONFIDANT on the ratio of received
to originated packets obtained in simulation. The parameters of the
reputation system are u = 0.99, w = 0.1, d = 0.5. A comparison
of detection speed when relying exclusively on own observations
versus taking into account second-hand information was made in
CONFIDANT and SORI. The results indicate that second-hand
information considerably speeds up the detection of misbehaving
nodes. For an example of CONFIDANT, see Figure 3.
9.2 Misbehavior with Liars
In this scenario, nodes not only misbehave in forwarding (and rout-
ing), but also in the reputation system itself, by spreading spurious
ratings. Given an honest majority of nodes, Context-Aware Detec-
tion can cope by its voting scheme and CONFIDANT is made ro-
bust by insisting on compatible ratings [4]. Even with liars, the use
of second-hand information decreases the detection time for trig-
gering a response. Figure 3 shows how second-hand information
speeds up misbehavior detection. Note that the “liars excluded”
line, i.e. the use of CONFIDANT to discard spurious ratings, leads
to a performance close to that of honest second-hand information.
The line “with liars” means that all second-hand information is be-
lieved, and we see that spurious ratings degrade the performance.
A theoretical analysis of this scenario was done in [11]. It is found
that there is a critical value pc for the probability p that a report
originates from a liar. As long as p < pc, the reputation system
eliminates the lies. If p > pc, intoxication is possible (see later).
With the parameters in Figure 2, pc ≈ 11+w , where w is the dis-
count factor for second-hand information.
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9.3 Liar Strategies
Untrustworthy nodes can have different strategies to publish their
falsified first-hand information attempting to influence reputation
ratings, e.g. when they want to discredit regular nodes. The basic
strategies are changing reported misbehavior instances, reported
regular behavior, both, mixed, or applied only occasionally.
If the lies are big, they will not pass the deviation test of CON-
FIDANT. A more sophisticated alternative are stealthy lies. Al-
though nodes do not know the content of the reputation ratings
held by others, they could try to infer from published first-hand in-
formation and then lie only so much as to just pass the deviation
test. Even then, the impact is very small as it only differs slightly
from what a node already thinks and is further reduced by fading.
CORE does not consider negative ratings, so only the case of flat-
tering has an impact. SORI is vulnerable to liars that are coopera-
tive when forwarding. Context-Aware Detection copes with single
liars or very small collusions by majority voting. Pathrater has no
defense against liars.
9.4 Brainwashing
When a node is surrounded by colluding lying nodes, it can be
tricked into believing false information. When it later moves into a
different neighborhood with honest nodes, it will not believe them
since their information deviates too much from its own. We call
this being brainwashed. Neither SORI, Context-Aware Detection,
nor CONFIDANT prevent brainwashing by collusion, but in CON-
FIDANT the ratings over time will return to neutral by fading and
the node can recover. As an aside, if a node is surrounded by misbe-
having nodes, cooperation cannot be guaranteed in any case since
there is no benign alternative for the first hop of a route.
9.5 Intoxication
When trust is adapted to experience as in CONFIDANT, if nodes
use the trust option to allow incompatible second-hand information
to be used in order to speed up detection, nodes could try to gain
trust from others by telling the truth over a sustained period of time
and only then start lying. We call this intoxication, it is mitigated
by two properties in CONFIDANT. First, fading discounts trust
gained in the past and recent deviations reduce trust more strongly.
Second, in telling the truth or publishing whichever information
passes the deviation test, they actually reinforce the reputation rat-
ings other nodes have, making it harder to get their then deviating
information accepted.
Intoxication can also occur in systems that rely on out-of-band
or predetermined trust, as the initial CONFIDANT, since nodes
can change their behavior even after they have been classified as
trusted. Unless trust ratings are adaptive, such systems remain vul-
nerable. The trust rating, however, needs to be adaptive to the trust
performance itself, otherwise, if it is adaptive to other behavior as
in SORI, lying nodes are not caught.
9.6 Identity Spoofing
The question of identity is central to reputation systems. Without
identity persistence, a badly rated node could disappear and reap-
pear with a different identity. For a reputation system to be useful,
the identity has to persist longer than the detection time of a mis-
behaving node. We showed in Figure 3 that the time needed for all
misbehaving nodes (non forwarding) to be detected as such by all
other nodes in a network of 100 nodes, given mobility, is on the or-
der of a hundred packets and much less for local detection [3]. One
way of achieving identity persistence is by expensive pseudonyms.
In the scenario where the mobile ad-hoc network is not completely
cut off the Internet, we can make use of certification authorities.
Other possible ways of providing identity are tamper-proof hard-
ware or radio signal watermarking.
10 Conclusions
We have shown in this article how reputation systems for self-
policing and adaptation to network cooperation can be built, and
how they can mitigate the deleterious effects of misbehavior in
self-organized networks by using monitoring to generate reputa-
tion ratings which in turn allow nodes to make informed decisions
about their response to the behavior of other nodes. We have de-
scribed how second-hand information can be used to improve the
response, while avoiding the dangers of rumor spreading. Our sur-
vey suggests that a reputation system is effective as long as the
number of misbehaving nodes is not too large; it would be interest-
ing to understand this point theoretically.
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